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Abstract
We derive a gravity equation from two general equilibrium models with multi-
national ¯rms: a symmetric ¯rm model where foreign a±liates rely on speci¯c
intermediate goods and a heterogenous ¯rms model with country-speci¯c ¯xed
costs. Although the reduced form gravity equation is the same, the structural
models behind it di®er. In the heterogenous ¯rm model less (but larger) ¯rms
enter more distant markets which yields lower aggregate sales. In the symmet-
ric ¯rm intermediate input model, in contrast, lower aggregate sales result from
lower sales per foreign a±liate. We use the gravity equation to discriminate
between the two models. Thereby, we ¯nd more support for the heterogenous
¯rm model.
Keywords: Gravity equation, multinational ¯rms, distance costs.
JEL classi¯cation: F23, F12, C21
11 Introduction
The reduction of distance costs between countries has been fostering multina-
tional activities abroad since the mid-eighties. In particular, foreign a±liates'
sales have grown tremendously. The bulk of multinational activities is horizon-
tal rather than vertical. Horizontal multinational activities refers to activities
of ¯rms that conduct the same activities at home and abroad, while verti-
cal activities refers to multinational ¯rms that locate di®erent activities in
di®erent countries.
The proximity-concentration model is the standard approach to explain hor-
izontal multinational ¯rms. According to it, ¯rms face a trade-o® between
concentrating their production at home to save on plant set-up costs and pro-
ducing abroad to save on distance costs. Thus, the model necessarily implies
that foreign a±liates' sales increase with distance costs. This is at odds with
the empirical ¯ndings based on aggregate data (Brainard, 1997; Buch et al.,
2005; Carr et al., 2001).
Neary (2006) o®ers two possible explanations to this paradox, that are outside
the bilateral proximity-concentration framework. First, preferential trade lib-
eralization leads to more activities by multinational ¯rms from third countries.
Second, mergers and acquisitions are encouraged rather than discouraged by
falling distance costs when distance costs are high.
We show that the paradox can also be explained within the bilateral proximity-
concentration framework. We argue that the discrepancies between the empir-
ical ¯ndings and the theoretical models can be solved by relaxing simplifying
assumptions. We propose two channels through which distance can a®ect neg-
atively foreign a±liates' sales. First, we show in a model of monopolistic com-
2petition with symmetric ¯rms, that increasing distance costs a®ect negatively
the volume of each a±liate's production when production requires imports
of domestic intermediate inputs. The model is close to the seminal paper of
Brainard (1997), but incorporates intermediate inputs. We assume that these
intermediates are imported from the home country. We base this assumption
on the empirical fact that one third of world trade is intra-¯rm trade and
this trade is increasingly in intermediate goods (Andersson and Fredriksson,
2000). In addition, the US Bureau of Economic Analysis reports that the ratio
of import of goods shipped to US a±liates of foreign multinational ¯rms over
a±liate sales is about 17% in 2002. BEA statistics show also that about 80%
of these imports are coming from the foreign parents.
Second, we show in a model of monopolistic competition with heterogenous
¯rms, that increasing distance costs a®ect negatively the number of foreign af-
¯liates if ¯xed set-up costs increase with distance. This model extend Helpman
et al. (2004), by relaxing the assumption that the ¯xed set-up costs are identi-
cal in all countries. We motivate the assumption that ¯xed costs increase with
distance by the fact that distance raises upfront search costs and organization
costs (Chaney, 2006; Rauch, 1999).
The models o®er three predictions on the impact of distance costs on (i)
the aggregated foreign a±liates' production, (ii) the number of active foreign
a±liates and, (iii) the average size of the foreign a±liate. First, both models
predict that aggregated a±liates' production decreases with distance costs.
Second, while the number of foreign a±liate is not a®ected by distance costs in
the symmetric ¯rm model, it decreases with distance costs in the heterogenous
¯rm model. Third, the average size of a foreign a±liate increases with distance
costs in the heterogenous ¯rm model but decreases with distance costs in the
symmetric ¯rm model.
3We introduce two models in order to make a clear distinction between the two
possible channel through which distance costs a®ect negatively aggregated
foreign a±liates' sales. Combining both channel in one model clouds the e®ect
on the average size of a foreign a±liate. The second and the third prediction
allow us to discriminate between the two theories.
We test our three predictions using the OECD Measuring Globalization data
set. This database has the merit to contain information on 21 OECD countries
but it has the drawback of being unbalanced. The number of observations for
some countries is very low. We therefore use an extensive data set on German
multinationals' foreign sales in order to check the robustness of our results.
We ¯nd a large and signi¯cantly negative e®ect of distance on the number
of foreign a±liates in a particular host country but no signi¯cant e®ect of
distance on the average size of the foreign a±liate. Our results give therefore
more support to the heterogeneous ¯rms model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present
the models and derive the equation to estimate. In Section 3, we provide a
discussion of the data and present the empirical strategy. In second 4, we
present our main results and the robustness check. In section 5, we conclude.
2 Two models of the horizontal multinational ¯rm
We consider an economy with two sectors: agriculture, which produces a ho-
mogeneous good A and manufacturing which produces a bundle M of di®er-
entiated goods. Consumers purchase A and M and have identical preferences
described by a utility function de¯ned on A and M. Consumers preferences
for single varieties of the M good are described by a sub-utility function de-
4¯ned on the varieties. The utility function of the representative consumer from

















xkij is the consumption by a individual in country j of a single variety produced
by ¯rm k from country i. The elasticity of substitution, ¾, is the same for any
pair of product and larger than one. We assume monopolistic competition in
manufacturing so that each variety of the manufacturing good is produced by
only one ¯rm.
We start with a symmetric ¯rm model with speci¯c intermediate inputs. In
the next subsection, we develop a model with heterogenous ¯rms with country
speci¯c distance dependant ¯xed costs but abstain from intermediate inputs.
2.1 A symmetric ¯rm model with ¯rm speci¯c intermediate goods





kij dk from equation (2) to the product nix
(¾¡1)=¾
ij , where we
suppressed the ¯rm subscript k. The price index in the manufacturing sector,







Given the total demand (1 ¡ ¹)Yj for di®erentiated products in country j
which is derived from equation (1), the demand for each variety is given by
equation (3). Each ¯rm's sales in foreign markets depend on its own price, pij,
in country j, on the price index, PMj, in j and on j's market size, Yj.
xij = p
¡¾
ij (1 ¡ ¹)YjP
¾¡1
Mj (3)
5Firms can serve foreign market j either by export or by producing abroad.
They choose to produce abroad if production abroad is more pro¯table than
















ij ] > fj; (4)
where fj denotes the ¯xed costs for an additional plant in country j. Thus
entry of a multinational ¯rms is determined by the level of the additional
¯xed costs but also by the di®erence in sales in the foreign market. As seen in
equation (4), the latter depends on the prices of the exported good pEx
ij relative
to the prices of the good produced abroad pMNE
ij . Note, that the number of
¯rms producing in the foreign country does not depend on distance costs, ¿.
All ¯rms from country i produce in country j or none of them, because they
are symmetric.
Following the proximity-concentration literature, we assume that exports incur
distance costs of the iceberg-type. We denote distance costs between country
i and j by ¿ij. Hence, pEx
ij = pii¿ij. We assume that the production of multi-
nationals' a±liates relies on intermediate inputs which are imported from the
home country. 1 The production technology of a ¯rm from country i produc-









cost function stems from a Cobb-Douglas production function with cost share
² for labor and 1 ¡ ² for the intermediate input. qij is the price for the inter-
mediate input used in the foreign a±liate located in country j of a ¯rm locate
in country i. wj denotes the wage in country j. Like the ¯nal manufacturing
goods, the intermediate inputs are subject to distance costs of iceberg-type.
1 Multinational ¯rms could also draw some intermediate inputs locally. However,
assuming the use of non-speci¯c local intermediate inputs by the foreign a±liates
has no e®ect on the ¯rm's decision between exporting and producing abroad. We
assume for sake of simplicity that all intermediate inputs are imported from the
home country.
6Hence, qij = qii¿ij. Given that the optimal price of a monopolistic competi-
tive ¯rm is always a ¯xed markup over the marginal costs, and that marginal
costs increase in distance costs, prices of goods produced in foreign a±liates
also increase in distance costs. Consequently, quantities sold abroad decrease
with distance costs. Nevertheless, pro¯ts from producing abroad might be
higher than from exporting. The aggregate value of sales country i's a±liates
in country j is given by equation (5).
nipijxij = nip
1¡¾




This equation of bilateral a±liates' sales can be transformed into a gravity
equation for a±liate sales. It contains the home country's supply character-
istics and the demand characteristics of the host country. As in Redding and
Venables (2004), (1¡¹)YjP
¾¡1
j refers to host country j's market capacity while
nip
1¡¾
ii refers to home country's supply capacity. We follow Reddings and Ven-
ables' terminology and denote market capacity as mj and supply capacity as
si. We denote bilateral foreign a±liates' production by ASij. We assume that
distance costs, ¿ij, are an increasing function of geographical distance between
country i and j, ¿ij = ¿Dij with ¿ being unit distance costs. Then, equation
(5) can be written in log-linearized form as
ln(ASij) = ®1 + ³1ln(si) ¡ ¯1ln(Dij) + »1ln(mj) (6)
where ®1 = (1 ¡ ¾)[ln(1 ¡ ²) + ln(¿)], ¯1 = (1 ¡ ¾). The structural gravity
equation implies a constraint on the estimates of parameter ³1 and »1. They
equal one. It is straightforward to test whether this constraints hold in the
empirical analysis.
72.2 A heterogenous ¯rm model with distance dependent ¯xed costs
The symmetric ¯rms assumption yields an equilibrium where all ¯rms are
active in the foreign country, independently of the distance between the two
countries. Yet, it is a well-known empirical fact that the number of ¯rms falls
with distance between two countries (Buch et al. 2005). Symmetric ¯rms mod-
els cannot explain this fact. We, therefore, depart from this assumption and
incorporate heterogenous ¯rms as in Helpman et al. (2004). Firms have dif-
ferent levels of productivity that they draw from a common distribution. Dif-
ferences in productivity translate into di®erent marginal costs, di®erent prices
and di®erent quantities for each ¯rm k. We denote the marginal costs of a ¯rm
k by ak and de¯ne the productivity level as !k = 1=ak. Pro¯t maximization
yields a ¯xed markup over the marginal costs ak of ½ = (¾ ¡ 1)=¾. Thus, the
price of ¯rm k located in country i and selling in country j, pkij = akij=½ leads
to ¯rm speci¯c quantities sold in j. Equation (3), which described the optimal
quantity sold in country j by a ¯rm located in country i in our symmetric







Although denoted by the same variable, the price index, PMj, in country j
di®ers from the one in the symmetric ¯rm model. First, it is a®ected by the
di®erence in productivity between ¯rms and thus their di®erent prices and
quantities. Second, it depends on the choice between serving the foreign market
j or not. Firms that choose to serve the foreign market decide to export or
to produce abroad. These choices depends on their productivity level !k. The












kij is the price of ¯rm k from country i selling in market j and having chosen
8the mode of entry h. The subscript h, h = Ex;MNE, indicates respectively
whether a ¯rm is an exporter or produces abroad. We normalize the mass of
¯rms from country i to one.
Each ¯rm compares the pro¯t related to each mode of entry in market j.
The ¯rms that have a higher productivity level than !Ex
j are active in this
market and earn positive pro¯t. Firms that have a productivity level equal to
!MNE
j are indi®erent between exporting and producing abroad because both
strategies yield the same pro¯t. Firms with a productivity level higher than
!MNE
j produce in country j and have higher pro¯ts than ¯rms with a lower
productivity level that export to j. We use the zero-pro¯t conditions to derive
the critical productivity levels (a) for a ¯rm that produces only for the home
market (b) for an exporting ¯rm and (c) for a ¯rm that produces abroad. This
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We assume that ¯xed costs of exporting fEx is a ¯xed share Á of the ¯xed
costs, fMNE, associated with the production abroad.
Following Helpman et al. (2004), we use the Pareto distribution to parame-
terize the distribution of ¯rms with respect to their productivity ! = 1=ak. If
¯rm's productivity ! are Pareto distributed with shape parameter ·, sales in
the domestic and in the foreign market are also Pareto distributed with shape
parameter · + (¾ ¡ 1). Aggregated a±liates sales of all ¯rms from country i




























i is the productivity level of the least productive (domestic) ¯rm
from country i that is still in the market. The ¯rst term gives the cumulative
probability of ¯rms from country i having an a±liate in country j. Multiplied
with the total mass of ¯rms from i, which is one by normalization, this gives the
number of a±liates in country j. The second term gives the average sales of a
foreign a±liate of ¯rms from country i in country j. The threshold productivity
level, !MNE
ij , determines the minimal size and the number of a±liate from
country i in country j. It is easy to see in (9) that the threshold productivity
level !MNE




















From the ¯rst term of equation (9), we see that the threshold productivity
level is negatively related to the number of ¯rms producing in country j. From
the second term, we see that the threshold productivity is positively related
to the average size of the a±liate. The total e®ect is negative, since · is larger
than ¾ ¡ 1.
Moreover, we show in the Appendix that distance has a positive impact on
the threshold productivity level if distance between countries is not too small.
Since aggregate sales are negatively related to the threshold productivity level
and distance a®ects the threshold productivity level positively, aggregate sales












Sales of active ¯rms in country i are proportional to the sales of country

















The ¯rst term gives the supply capacity, si, of country i. It gives the sales of
the average ¯rm from country i multiplied with the number of ¯rms which is
normalized to one. The second term, which we denote by ©, is the weighted
ratio of the smallest productivity level of a domestic ¯rm and the threshold
productivity level for production in country j. We show in the Appendix that
the threshold productivity level is a positive function of the distance between
i and j. Thus, as shown above the distance e®ect on the aggregate sales is
negative.
For simplicity, we assume that © = ¸D
¡´
ij . This form is very °exible and
exhibits the negative impact of distance on aggregate sales.
The third term gives the market capacity of country j, mj = (1 ¡ ¹)YjP
¾¡1
Mj .





Log-linearizing equation (10) yields the second gravity equation.
ln(ASij) = ®2 + ³2ln(si) ¡ ¯2ln(Dij) + »2ln(mj) (11)
where ®2 = ¡´ln(¸) and ¯2 = ´. As in the preceding model, the structural
11gravity equation implies a constraint on the estimates of parameter ³2 and »2.
3 Empirical Methodology
3.1 Estimation Strategy
The theoretical analysis leads to the same reduced-form gravity equation for
both models. We can however discriminate between the two models because
the underlying structures of the reduced form di®er. In particular, distance
costs a®ect di®erently the number of foreign a±liates, nij, and the average
size of an a±liate, asij = ¹ pij¹ xij, in the two models, although the e®ect on
aggregate sales ASij = nijasij is qualitatively the same.
One outcome of the ¯rst model which assumes symmetric ¯rms and incorpo-
rates speci¯c intermediate inputs, is that distance costs have a negative impact
on the (average) size of an a±liate but have no impact on the number of af-
¯liates in the foreign country. Using equation (5), and assuming ¿ij = ¿Dij
it is easy to show that distance a®ect aggregate a±liates' sales only through
the average a±liate sales. We derive the e®ect of distance on the number of
foreign a±liates, nij and the (average) size of an a±liate, asij = pijxij = ¹ pij¹ xij
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According to the second model, which assumes heterogenous ¯rms, distance
has an impact on the threshold productivity level !MNE
ij . This impact depends
12on the ¯xed costs, f, the variable distance costs ¿ and the elasticity of sub-
stitution ¾ (See Appendix for derivation). If distance has a positive impact
on the productivity threshold, then the aggregate sales of foreign a±liates de-
crease in distance (equation 9). The ¯rst moment of the Pareto distribution,
·!MNE
ij
·¡1 , gives the average sales of the foreign a±liates. It follows from equa-
tion (9) that distance has a positive e®ect on average size of a foreign a±liate
asij if the distance e®ect on the productivity is positive. Thus, in the second
model, distance has a negative e®ects on aggregate sales but a positive e®ect
on average sales of foreign a±liates. Hence, the e®ect on the number of foreign
a±liates, nij, must go in the same direction as the e®ect on aggregate sales.
Moreover, if aggregate sales fall with distance, the number of foreign a±liates
has to fall even stronger to compensate the increase of average size of the





























We therefore estimate gravity equations, that explain the impact of distance
costs on (i) aggregate foreign a±liates sales, (ii) average a±liate sales, and (iii)
the number of foreign a±liates active abroad. We decompose market capacity
mj = YjP
1¡¾
Mj into its income and its weighted price level components, Y and
P. While we argue that the coe±cient of the market capacity variable is one,
that does only apply to the income variable, when we also control for the price
level component. We proxy the income variable by host country's GDP.
The supply capacity is proportional to home country's income in both models.
We proxy the supply capacity by home country's GDP. As argued above, the
coe±cient of home country's GDP is constrained to one.
13Finally, the distance between countries is proxied by the great arc distance
between the largest city of any two countries.
3.2 Data
Data on bilateral activities of multinational ¯rms are rare. For our purpose,
we use the OECD Measuring Globalization database. It contains information
on sales of foreign a±liates and their number for 21 OECD countries and
about 50 partner countries from 1983 to 2001. Unfortunately, the database
does not have all information for all combinations of country and year. We
work with aggregated data for manufacturing to achieve the widest possible
country coverage. Moreover, we restrict our analysis to the period from 1991
to 2001, because the number of observation for the eighties is very low. The
sales data are converted into US dollar.
The resulting sample is very unbalanced. Overall, there are 1885 observations
on a±liate sales and 1052 observations on the number of a±liates in the sam-
ple. There are 755 combinations of year, home and host country, for which
we ¯nd observation on both the number of a±liates and their sales. For the
activities of six host countries (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Ireland, United States) there is no year-home country combination for which
both information is available. This reduces the number of OECD countries
in our sample to 15. The observations are not evenly distributed over time.
Their number reaches from 106 observations in 1999 to 355 observations in
1994. They are also not evenly distributed regarding their cross-section dimen-
sion. There are 3 observations for Denmark and 86 observations for Germany.
Since a large share of observation in the OECD sample is German data, we use
14the MiDi database of the Deutsche Bundesbank to assess the robustness of our
results. This database comprises ¯rm level information on foreign a±liate sales
of German multinational ¯rms. We aggregate foreign a±liates' sales and the
number of foreign a±liates from each of the 16 German state in 116 countries
for each year between 1989 and 2004. We restrict however our analysis to the
period from 1991 to 2001 to consider the same time period as for the OECD
database. These sales data are also converted into US dollar.
Regarding the explanatory variables, we retrieve the GDP data in US dollar
from the WDI database of the World Bank. The price level is taken from the
OECD Comparative Price Level database. We convert the bilateral price level
indexes into an index of countries' price level relative to the OECD average.
Distance is taken from the CEPII distance data base (www.cepii.fr) which
contains the distance between the largest city of any two countries.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of our data.
Before we interpret the results, we brie°y mention two econometric issues of
the speci¯ed model. First, since the number of a±liates is a count variable,
we use a poisson regression techniques for the equation explaining the number
of foreign a±liates. Second, we use the Huber-White method to correct for
serially correlated responses country pairs (Wooldridge 2002).
4 Results
We present results from 4 regressions for both samples. Speci¯cation (S1) is
the gravity equation (6) and (11) explaining foreign a±liate sale. Thereby,
(S1) explicitly accounts for the parameter restriction on the coe±cients of the
GDP of the home country ³ and the GDP of the host country » discussed
15Table 1
Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
OECD Sample
ln Foreign A±liates Sales 713 7.625 1.903
ln Average Sales 713 3.868 0.982
Number of A±liates 713 3.757 1.390
ln GDP Home 713 27.768 1.271
ln GDP Host 713 27.000 1.228
ln Distance 713 7.861 1.199
Price Index 713 92.888 30.801
Border 713 0.123 0.329
Former Colony 713 0.052 0.222
German Sample
ln Foreign A±liates Sales 6782 10.998 2.206
ln Average Sales 6782 9.727 1.371
Number of A±liates 6782 8.832 16.405
ln GDP Home 6782 11.887 0.846
ln GDP Host 6567 11.832 1.649
ln Distance 6782 8.072 1.140
Price Index 2970 87.719 26.638
above. Both coe±cients are constrained to one. Speci¯cation (S2) is the the
gravity equation (6) and (11) explaining foreign a±liate sale but estimates ³
and ». Speci¯cation (S3) and (S4) are gravity equations explaining average
a±liate sales and the number of foreign a±liates, respectively.
4.1 The OECD Sample
The e®ect of the gravity variables on foreign a±liates sales, average sales of a
foreign a±liate and, the number of foreign a±liates in the OECD countries is
shown in Table (2). Speci¯cation (S1) presents the results of the constrained
model and the LR-statistics on the validity of the constraints. The results of
the unconstrained models are presented in speci¯cations (S2) to (S4).
The results in (S2) con¯rm earlier results from gravity equations. While home
and host country GDP a®ect foreign a±liate sales positively, distance between
16Table 2
Gravity Equation explaining Total foreign sales, Average foreign sales and the Num-
ber of A±liates: OECD Sample
Constrained Unconstrained
Model Model
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4)
Aij Aij aij n
y
ij
GDPhome 1.00 0.534¤¤¤ 0.173¤¤¤ 0.456¤¤¤
(0.105) (0.050) (0.143)
GDPhost 1.00 0.779¤¤¤ 0.336¤¤¤ 0.510¤¤¤
(0.113) (0.048) (0.080)
Distance -0.506¤¤¤ -0.378¤¤¤ 0.016 -0.320¤¤¤
(0.049) (0.103) (0.050) (0.106)
Price Level -0.001 0.005 0.004 -0.011¤¤
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -43.096¤¤¤ -25.778¤¤¤ -10.476¤¤¤ -18.606¤¤¤
(0.426) (4.381) (1.928) (3.999)




Robust standard errors in parentheses.




¤¤¤ denotes statistical signi¯cance at one percent level od signi¯cance.
¤¤ denotes statistical signi¯cance at ¯ve percent level of signi¯cance.
¤ denotes statistical signi¯cance at ten percent level of signi¯cance.
the two countries a®ects sales negatively. All three coe±cients are signi¯cant
on the one percent level. In particular the coe±cient on home country GDP
is smaller than one. The restriction on both coe±cients in (S1) is therefore
rejected on the one percent level of signi¯cance. Although the gravity equation
suggests that the coe±cients on both GDP variables are one, this restriction
is not consistent with the data.
The gravity equation related to the number of foreign a±liates (S4) shows
basically the same e®ects as (S2), the equation explaining total foreign sales.
The e®ect of distance on sales of foreign a±liates is larger (in absolute terms)
than on the number of foreign a±liates. Yet, the di®erence between both
17coe±cients is not statistically signi¯cant (F(1;168) = 0:32, p¡value = 0:574).
This insigni¯cant di®erence can also be read from (S3). The e®ect of distance
on average sales of foreign a±liates is positive but insigni¯cant. Thus, distance
a®ects total a±liate sales negatively through reducing the number of a±liates
in a foreign country but not by changing the average size of the foreign a±liate.
Regarding our assessment of the channel behind the success of the gravity
equation, the results give more weight to the heterogenous ¯rm model. We have
two main results. First, distance a®ects both, a±liates sales and the number of
foreign a±liates negatively. In more distant markets, less ¯rms are active. The
symmetric ¯rm model with speci¯c intermediate goods, does not feature this
selection process. Second, average sales of a foreign a±liate are una®ected by
distance. The theoretical models in section 2, in contrast, predict increasing
average sales with increasing distance (heterogenous ¯rm model) or decreasing
average sales with increasing distance (speci¯c intermediate goods model). It
might be, that both channels are at work so that we cannot disentangle the
e®ect in the data.
While distance does not have a signi¯cant e®ect on average sales of a foreign
a±liate, the size of the home market has a positive e®ect on the average sales.
This gives additional support to the heterogenous ¯rm model. In this model as
presented in Section 2.2, sales of foreign a±liates are proportional to sales of
their parent ¯rm. Parent ¯rms, however, are larger in larger countries if pro-
ductivity, and therefore ¯rm size, is log-normal or pareto distributed. 2 Thus,
home country's size a®ects the average size of a foreign a±liate positively in
the heterogenous ¯rm model. The symmetric ¯rm model adjusts only through
the extensive margin. Larger countries host more but not larger ¯rms.
2 See Sutton (1997) and Axtell (2001) for empirical analyses of ¯rm distributions.
18Table 3




GDPhome 0.544¤¤¤ 0.170¤¤¤ 0.415¤¤¤
(0.100) (0.050) (0.094)
GDPhost 0.714¤¤¤ 0.358¤¤¤ 0.398¤¤¤
(0.112) (0.049) (0.077)
Distance -0.309¤¤¤ -0.008 -0.194
(0.112) (0.049) (0.138)
Price Level 0.006 0.003 -0.006¤
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Border 0.815¤¤ -0.229 0.888¤¤
(0.379) (0.148) (0.372)
Colonial relationship 1.270¤¤¤ 0.016 1.195¤¤¤
(0.431) (0.250) (0.346)
Common language -0.496 -0.261 0.225
(0.565) (0.326) (0.533)
Constant -25.055¤¤¤ -10.745¤¤¤ -16.070¤¤¤
(4.362) (1.912) (2.951)
Observations 713 713 713
R-squared 0.46 0.30
Robust standard errors in parentheses.




¤¤¤ denotes statistical signi¯cance at one percent level od signi¯cance.
¤¤ denotes statistical signi¯cance at ¯ve percent level of signi¯cance.
¤ denotes statistical signi¯cance at ten percent level of signi¯cance.
In Table (3), we conduct a number of robustness test by including three
dummy variables. First, we construct a border dummy that takes the value
of one if two countries share the same border and zero otherwise. Second, we
include a dummy variable that takes the value of one for a pair of countries
which used to be in a colonizer-colony relationship and the value of zero oth-
erwise. Third, we include a common language dummy variable that takes the
value of one if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the population in both
countries and zero otherwise.
The results regarding the dummy variable indicating a neighboring country
(border) are also in line with earlier ¯nding (Barba-Navaretti and Venables
192004). Activities in neighboring countries are signi¯cantly higher than pre-
dicted by their size and distance alone. The border e®ect for the number of
¯rms is not statistically distinguishable from that for foreign a±liates sales
(F(1;168) = 0:04;p ¡ value = 0:848). The border coe±cient is negative but
has no signi¯cant impact on average sales of foreign a±liates. Note that the
distance coe±cient becomes smaller when we include the border dummy vari-
able. This is in line with the previous results since there are more foreign
a±liates in countries that are closer. We ¯nd a positive coe±cient for the
colonial relationship variable on foreign a±liate sales and the number of a±l-
iates abroad. The e®ect on average sales, in contrast, is insigni¯cant. There is
no signi¯cant e®ect of common language on foreign activities of multinational
¯rms.
4.2 The German Sample
We conduct the same analysis using a German database because the results
using the OECD sample might be a®ected by its unbalanced structure. The
German data, in contrast, are balanced. We construct the aggregated data
from a ¯rm-level database which entails information on all foreign a±liates of
German multinational ¯rms if they exceed the reporting limit. We aggregate
the micro data for each combination of German State, host country and year.
Due to the unavailability of price level data for some countries, the sample
reduces strongly. Our samples comprises of 2280 observations. We estimate
OLS regressions comparable to those for the OECD sample.
Table (4) presents the coe±cient of the OLS gravity equations. The results
are qualitatively very similar to the results for the OECD sample presented
in Table (2).
20Table 4
Gravity Equation explaining Total foreign sales, Average foreign sales and the Num-
ber of A±liates: German Sample
Constrained Unconstrained
Model Model
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4)
Aij Aij aij n
y
ij
GDPhome 1.00 1.481¤¤¤ 0.407¤¤¤ 1.129¤¤¤
(0.088) (0.060) (0.055)
GDPhost 1.00 0.884¤¤¤ 0.330¤¤¤ 0.620¤¤¤
(0.075) (0.049) (0.045)
Distance -0.531¤¤¤ -0.506¤¤¤ -0.044 -0.486¤¤¤
(0.026) (0.079) (0.056) (0.043)
Price Level -0.014¤¤¤ -0.012¤¤¤ 0.003¤ -0.016¤¤¤
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -7.315¤¤¤ -11.815¤¤¤ 1.284 -14.050¤¤¤
(0.226) (1.293) (0.842) (0.845)




Robust standard errors in parentheses.




¤¤¤ denotes statistical signi¯cance at one percent level od signi¯cance.
¤¤ denotes statistical signi¯cance at ¯ve percent level of signi¯cance.
¤ denotes statistical signi¯cance at ten percent level of signi¯cance.
As for the OECD sample, the likelihood ratio test rejects the validity of the
constraints at one the percent level of signi¯cance. This results from the coef-
¯cient of German state GDP, which is well above unity. The large coe±cient
of the GDPhome variable might result from the low internationalization level
of ¯rms in the low GDP states in East Germany. Firms in East Germany have
started to internationalize their activities only in 1991. In order to control
for this e®ect, we include a dummy variable which is takes the value of one
for East German State and zero otherwise. Additionally, we include a State-
border dummy which takes the value one if a German state and a partner
country share a common border and zero otherwise. Our empirical results are
robust to the introduction of the dummy variables. The results are shown in
21Table 5




GDPhome 1.331¤¤¤ 0.351¤¤¤ 1.037¤¤¤
(0.088) (0.064) (0.055)
GDPhost 0.929¤¤¤ 0.352¤¤¤ 0.620¤¤¤
(0.071) (0.065) (0.043)
Distance -0.515¤¤¤ -0.065 -0.434¤¤¤
(0.077) (0.058) (0.039)
Price Level -0.015¤¤¤ 0.002 -0.017¤¤¤
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
State-Border 0.676¤ 0.028 0.492¤¤
(0.360) (0.238) (0.221)
East German States -1.849¤¤¤ -0.707¤¤¤ -1.391¤¤¤
(0.244) (0.202) (0.131)
Constant -10.215¤¤¤ 1.977¤¤ -13.247¤¤¤
(1.201) (0.848) (0.837)
Observations 2964 2964 2987
R-squared 0.55 0.23
Robust standard errors in parentheses.




¤¤¤ denotes statistical signi¯cance at one percent level od signi¯cance.
¤¤ denotes statistical signi¯cance at ¯ve percent level of signi¯cance.
¤ denotes statistical signi¯cance at ten percent level of signi¯cance.
Table (5).
The state-border dummy variable has a signi¯cant and positive e®ect on for-
eign a±liate sales and the number of a±liates in a particular partner country.
The coe±cient in the regression explaining average sales, in contrast, is not
signi¯cant. The distance coe±cient is not a®ected by the inclusion of the
state-border dummy variable. The East German dummy variable is signi¯-
cantly negative at one percent level of signi¯cance in all three regressions.
East German ¯rms have less and smaller foreign a±liates than ¯rms from
West Germany. That might stem from their late internationalization process.
225 Conclusion
In this paper, we present two models of multinational ¯rms. We derived a grav-
ity equation explaining aggregated foreign a±liate sales as reduced form from
both model. We argue that as for foreign trade, the success of gravity equa-
tion in empirical analysis stems from the fact that it results as reduced form
from various theoretical models (Kleinert and Toubal 2005). Yet, although
the reduced form is the same the structure behind it di®ers. That allows us to
discriminate between the two models we proposed and to assess their relative
importance. In particular, distance a®ects the number of a±liates negatively
only in the heterogenous ¯rm model. The models di®er also with respect to the
distance e®ect on the average size of a foreign a±liate. While distance a®ects
the size of the average a±liate positively in the heterogenous ¯rm model, it
a®ects size negatively in the speci¯c intermediate goods model.
For the empirical assessment of the relative importance we used a quasi panel
of 16 host countries reporting the activities of multinational ¯rms from about
50 home countries in the time period from 1991 to 2001. The data set comes
from the OECD Measuring Globalization database. The data reports aggre-
gated sales of foreign a±liates, their number in every host country broken
down by the home country of the parent ¯rms. Unfortunately, the data is
very unbalanced. We therefore veri¯ed the robustness of our results using a
German data set at the level of German states.
Our results give support to the heterogenous ¯rm model. The number of for-
eign a±liates of ¯rms from a particular home country in a particular host
country decreases in the distance between the two countries. Additionally,
neighboring countries receive an over proportional share of foreign a±liates.
The fall in the number of a±liates in more distant foreign countries explains
23a very large fraction of the fall in total a±liate sales in these countries. Yet,
our second criteria is not met by the data. Distance does not signi¯cantly
a®ect the average size of foreign a±liates, neither positively nor negatively
as predicted by our models. Since the distance induced e®ect of intermediate
goods and selection of heterogenous ¯rms operate in opposite directions, the
insigni¯cant e®ect of distance on average a±liate sales might result from their
combined e®ect.
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Appendix I
We use equation (8c) to derive the e®ect of distance on the critical level of
productivity. We assume that ¯xed costs are a linear function of distance in
a similar way as variable distance costs. Hence, (1 ¡ Á)fMNE
ij = fDij and
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This ¯rst term gives the e®ect of variable distance costs on the productivity
threshold. The e®ect is negative. The second term gives the e®ect of distance
dependent ¯xed costs on the productivity threshold level. The e®ect is positive.
The total e®ect of distance depends on f, ¿ and ¾. The productivity threshold
decreases in f and increases in ¿ and ¾. Finally, rewriting the above equation,
we show that the e®ect of distance on the productivity threshold is always
positive for distances that are not too small.
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